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Paris, Friday, November 2, 1962

Jean Monnet:

Sees long period of political confusion ahead in France, but thinks de Gaulle will adapt himself to opposition in Parliament. Parliamentary election will go against de Gaulle, although the public reluctantly accepted the constitutional amendment. DeGaulle won't like opposition, but he accepts facts and is realistic enough to adjust. He will not resign.

Monnet does not think any special actions from U.S. are required to improve relations with France. Real friends in France have not doubted U.S. Certainly it would be foolish for U.S. to give nuclear help to France.

Paradoxically, relations may improve because of Cuba. De Gaulle admires determination, and this showed that Kennedy and U.S. have it. De Gaulle fully understands that U.S. could not have consulted him further. Thinks alliance strengthened.

Worried at same time about a recession in Europe. Sees one coming in U.S., and thinks effects cannot be offset here. German stock exchange, for example, has lost half value. Lesser problem in Paris. Much paper profit loss, but some people really hurt. Psychological reaction to U.S. behavior.

Monnet obviously does not think much of Per ~~XXXXXX~~ Jacobsson, but agrees with him on danger of deflation -- says only that Jacobsson was way behind everyone else in worrying too long about inflation. More public spending is necessary in Europe. New Common Market report on economic forecast is good. French Plan will not be affected by recession. But governmental stimulus definitely necessary.

But U.S. is bigger problem. There should have been a tax cut last summer; it is now late. U.S. needs deficit with larger unbalanced budget, and far more public works to get economy moving.

Monnet still confident Britain will enter Common Market. Thinks Britain hasn't always been realistic in bargaining; must expect Europe also to protect interests. Still must learn to think as Europeans. But is happy about intellectual conversions.

~~XXXXXX~~ Detests Gaitskell, whom he regards as "false intellectual" -- hopes he has ruined himself. Although thinks James Callaghan, shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, a second rater though amiable.

Much interested in talking about Khrushchev and India. Perplexed that Russians don't support India. Thinks Khrushchev was testing U.S. determination in Cuba and seeking a nuclear advantage; but Russians don't want war and had no intention of provoking one.

Addendum to above: British are doing too much talking about ~~XXXXXX~~ leading Europe. Where they really can lead is in realm of ideas. But leadership is a factor of quality, not of size or weight.

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Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen:

Very much taken with de Gaulle's cordial reception, and with charm and wit. Off the record, when de Gaulle asked why U.S. supported United Nations, Bohlen said that forum was ~~most~~ useful for talking to Russians under cover. De Gaulle mused a minute and said "There's something to that."

De Gaulle certainly won't like political developments here any more than he likes results of referendum. His real objective is to force a sort of two-party system in France: a leftist party grouped around the Socialists, perhaps with the MRP and the Liberals; and a rightist party grouped around the Gaullists. De Gaulle is not really an elected dictator; he thinks that a strong executive, with periodic referendums, is a purer kind of democracy. Understands necessity for legislature but has enormous contempt for old parties and would like at least to reshape them. Basic guide to his views is still his memoirs.

Never has liked concept of U.N. because it limits French grandeur and independent action. This is nothing new: it antedates both Algeria and Indochina and goes back to formation.

Bohlen has brought no gifts for de Gaulle. There isn't much we can do, certainly in the nuclear field. Yet de Gaulle ~~said~~ surely will have his own nuclear weapons. But relations are somewhat better than press stories have made out.

It is true that de Gaulle has not cooperated with NATO, which he never has liked. But in terms of withdrawal of the ~~French~~ French Navy this is meaningless, because cooperation continues in all exercises. De Gaulle has refused U.S. nuclear storage facilities in France; this is serious, but it is not crippling, because facilities are available elsewhere. On one other ~~point~~ refusal to put French troops in Germany, de Gaulle has a point: he is trying to "Frenchify" the army after its long service in Indonesia, Algeria and the strains of the CAS. This makes sense.

De Gaulle almost certainly doesn't want Britain in Common Market, but Bohlen doesn't yet know whether he actually will attempt to block. His basic mistrust of Anglo-Saxons remains.

Bohlen emphasized again that he had brought nothing tangible with which to improve relations with de Gaulle (he seemed to be denying stories that U.S. was changing nuclear policy). There was no emergency requiring the ambassadorial change.

U.S. policy remains to seek the European nuclear deterrent within NATO -- a force de frappe in which we have a say. No decisions are likely at the NATO Ministerial meeting in December. Rather, the NATO Council has been exploring some of the economic issues of a NATO deterrent.

Bohlen was in the midst of the Cuba affair. Kennedy literally didn't have confirmation of intelligence until Tuesday, Oct. 16 when the photos ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ taken on Sunday were placed on his desk. Political charges that information was withheld are nonsense. Key point was verification of what the bases were to be used for; this could not be learned until surveillance showed

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a considerable amount of hardware as well as actual dispositions of the "digging" at the missile sites. Even yet we have no sure intelligence that there were nuclear warheads for the missiles; but we have to assume this. Throughout the affair the Administration was determined to stand. We let Khrushchev know, through notes, that we were determined. I said I assumed that there had also been some diplomatic activity that had not been made public. Chip did not contradict this.

At one point President asked Bohlen to remain behind and not make scheduled address to French group in New York before departure, because Kennedy needed him. Bohlen persuaded him that this would cause more eyebrow-raising than it was worth.

Why did Khrushchev do it? This still puzzles Bohlen. He does not give much credence to pressures within Kremlin. Thinks now that matter was decided last June or July as deliberate effort. This fits together with Khrushchev's comment to Udall that U.S. was soft, later comment to Kekkonen (which Bohlen hadn't heard). Bohlen thinks Khrushchev planned to come to U.S. for U.N. meeting at end of November, confront U.S. with fait accompli, and then say: "Okay, boys, let's negotiate about Berlin."

Why, then, was so much in the open -- did Khrushchev think he ~~men~~ could escape surveillance? No answer. Bohlen discounts theory, though, that Khrushchev thought he could tie the matter up in the U.N. by getting neutrals into the act.

Bohlen told Larry Collins of Newsweek, who also saw him today, that he thought the meeting of the Central Committee in Moscow November 14 would be very important in this connection, and that Khrushchev's position pretty definitely had been shaken.

Elbridge Durbrow, U.S. Minister to NATO:

Reaction to Cuba in NATO Council was absolutely solid. No wavering at all. Durbrow himself brought Acheson into 10 p.m. meeting. Acheson was recognized in corridors by Italian Ambassador, then by French, and an undercurrent was buzzing. We hadn't told NATO what it was: merely that the U.S. called a briefing for 10 p.m. Monday, October 22, on Cuban situation. Acheson had seen de Gaulle at 5 p.m. (going there alone) after arriving about 3 a.m. Sherman Kent, chief of photo interpretation for CIA, accompanied Acheson.

British also were good in NATO stand, despite reports of wavering in London (my own information is that Macmillan, Home and Thorneycroft were solid, but others in cabinet wavered; Mac was unhappy about no consultation at beginning even though he had a lot more than others, but soon recovered). Even Paul Mason, British representative in NATO whom Durbrow regards as a Grade A jerque, was good on the issue. Mason being transferred.

Why did Khrushchev do it? Again no answer. Probably expected to confront U.S. with fait accompli. At any rate it was damned close, and people here had little sleep for two weeks.

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We never said it publicly, but we were prepared to use nuclear weapons on th^{is} bases -- and we gave lots of hints.

Do we now expect something on Berlin? Rather less than more ~~likely~~ likely. Khrushchev will need some time to lick wounds.

Here Durby interposed that whereas there had been absolutely no politics in Administration decision on Cuba, the recent talk about looming crisis in Berlin was very largely political. There simply was no evidence that anything more was coming in Berlin. When Bundy and Rostow started sounding off about it, NATO was asked for information which it couldn't give. This caused suspicions in the NATO Council. When U.S. came to the Council on Cuba, there was a certain amount of suspicion to overcome, because it was pretty plain that we had been using the Berlin issue for campaign purposes. The NATO countries rallied magnificently. But we pretty plainly have cried wolf too much on this point, and we'll have to document more calls. Norstad, incidentally, has been magnificent in his unflappability on this point.

French cooperation at the working level in NATO is very good, much better than many stories indicate. De Gaulle also obviously was flattered by Acheson visit, did not press point of non~~int~~ consultation. Support of French over Cuba excellent.

Durby thinks it would be folly, though, to give nuclear help to de Gaulle even though he will have his own weapons. De Gaulle can't be bought. But Durby very much fears a "European deterrent" built around France and Britain and operating independently of the U.S. We simply have to be in it; it must be multilateral. Important to have Germans in it too for sense of sharing. But European deterrent would be dangerous and wouldn't work.

How far along is NATO deterrent? Not very. Certainly won't come up for decision at Dec. 13-15 NATO meeting ~~now~~ in Paris, not, probably, at May meeting likely to be held in The Hague.

NATO ministerial meetings just aren't very important. They basically ratify what has been done by NATO Council. Council itself much upgraded in recent months. There has been some consideration of economic aspects of NATO deterrent, but nothing ready for decision. Main value of ministerial meetings is that they give foreign ministers a chance to see one another privately. But forum is simply too big for any useful debate or decision taking. They really boil down into efforts to compose the communique to present the best face on things; the communique committee has the most important job.

Ambassador Thomas K. Finletter:

French cooperation on Cuba excellent. In realm of better relations with de Gaulle we can't do much. Finletter implies that he would like to cooperate on nuclear, but policy is other way; he is very loyal to Kennedy. Policy is unchanged even though it is idiotic not to have more cooperation. We can't

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give in to de Gaulle on the directoire. His whole idea with the directoire 's to destroy NATO. We couldn't have one without including the Germans; then Italians would want in; and why not Benelux?

Finletter does not expect new crisis on Berlin. Any evidence to support recent alarm in Washington? No. Then why the alarm? Finletter had supposed that this was based upon intelligence not available to him here, but NATO certainly didn't have it.

Thinks Lemnitzer will have a harder time than Norstad because he is not a popular hero; but predicts he will be the best NATO commander of all. By implication critical of Nobstad because too political; Lemnitzer strictly a military general. I asked whether Kennedy was critical of Norstad because too political (I have always thought the assignment semi-political). No answer. Kennedy not critical of Norstad over Berlin, though; Norstad has been very calm throughout, and President has admired this.

Returned to idea of independent nuclear deterrent. U.S. dedicated to idea of trying to meet through NATO. Must have the Germans in it. De Gaulle, however, remains basically suspicious of Anglo-Saxons. He doesn't like us. De Gaulle's Europe, again spelled out in his memoirs, runs from the Iberian Peninsula and Italy to the Urals, but excludes England and Scandinavia. This is why he dislikes NATO: we are in it.

NATO research and development effort not going well. Very little cooperation. Finletter concedes we have had a tendency to hog orders, for good and sufficient domestic economic reasons because we bear brunt of burden; but doesn't go over well. When Common Market becomes more integrated bidding will become stronge

Waverley Waverley Root reports that Mendes-France says the Secret Army remains a powerful political force in France; Paul Reynaud, however, says that it is dead.

RObert Button, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Mission to NATO: Finletter, no fan of Acheson, said after Acheson had told how he had impressed de Gaulle; "Dean was never one to underestimate his ability to impress others." Acheson saw de Gaulle alone. Cecil Lyon, U.S. Minister, made introductions.

Button had not heard rumor, which I picked up in London, that Finletter might be replaced after first of year because Kennedy allegedly dissatisfied with him.

Finletter was very distressed because of Don Shannon story published in Washington Post several weeks ago indicating that U.S. had changed policy on nuclear weapons to France. This followed backgrounder which Shannon attended with only six persons (Root couldn't go). Story had no basis in fact, but made use of some material Finletter had given on pledge not to use. Finletter so distressed ~~as~~ he swore to have no more backgrounders Manning and Selinger, who visited shortly thereafter, heard

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about it and told Finletter he would have to hold more backgrounder even if things leaked. Finletter agreed but unconvincing. Now extremely gun-shy. Has avowed never to see Shannon again.

Paris, Friday, November 3, 1962

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, new commander, U.S. forces in Europe; to take command of SHAPE Jan. 1.

U.S. had no thought of using nuclear weapons in Cuba. Even if bombardment had been required (and it was damned close last Sunday), U.S. would have had plenty of conventional weapons with which to act.

Actually Kennedy presented Russians with an ultimatum: either you take the missiles and bases out, or we will take them out. This was conveyed through more diplomatic language, but the message and meaning were unmistakable.

NATO was alerted, although there was not a full alert. Period was very tense here.

Lemnitzer does not particularly expect trouble in Berlin. It would be easier for Russians to make trouble for us elsewhere, as in Iran where the ties are much looser. In Berlin the situation is just as clear as in Cuba, and U.S. military does not expect Khrushchev to take on a frontal challenge.

Then why all the U.S. excitement just before Cuba about a Soviet move in Berlin? (Lemnitzer was then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). L himself wondered why. Presumably it came from readings of Khrushchev's successive statements. He did not himself share the alarm.

If we should get into a negotiation between NATO and Warsaw Pacts, are any of the NATO bases possibly negotiable for a price? L very skeptical. Turkish bases remain important in his judgment. Actually he would like more weapons there. The Jupiters are obsolete, but they are still quite potent weapons. Conceivably our dispositions there might be traded, but it would have to be something very good and with absolute certainty of verification.

L conceded that Turkey is the only place where we have missiles in a country actually bordering the Soviet Union; he had never thought of that before!

But whole disengagement theory gives him chills. He is sorry British are giving up Thors, at least without getting something for them. He would like to have some Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, which is ideal for such operations. None there now. Sixth fleet should have some.

We have no missiles at American bases in Pakistan, but bases are extremely important for intelligence and surveillance. We can "listen" to Soviet missile firings.

Lemnitzer encouraged rather than discouraged by situation in Viet-Nam. Much impressed by Diem; says McNamara was likewise. Diem certainly has his defects politically and with nepotism. But when people start criticizing him, L always asks what is

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alternative. No one has yet suggested anything practical. L concedes, though, that war can't be won by military means.

U.S. aid program has helped set up "strategic hamlet" concept in Viet-Nam, whereby farmers are trained in defense of villages. Working quite well. And for first time Viet-Nam army, which previously had been tied down to static defense, is able to take offensive against Viet Cong. Going surprisingly well, better than expected.

Big problem is incursions-viz across Cambodian border. L does not accuse Sihanouk of complicity but says Cambodia unable to patrol borders. Viet Cong escapes across border; and this causes bad relations between Cambodia and Viet-Nam. We have suggested to Cambodia that it put best troops along border to plug holes and that we will help train replacements for other defense duties; but Cambodians don't want to spare trained troops for Viet-Nam border.

Lemnitzer disputes thesis that U.S. concentrated too long on divisional-type training in Viet-Nam. Our basic objective was to train five-division army plus very small navy and air force, and this we have done. But we also have adopted Malayan tactics and have long concentrated on guerilla training. Problem is that borders of Viet-Nam are much harder to seal than Malayan; and even Malaya took eight years.

U.S. has had no special military talks with India on defense; military officials are cordial, but there have been no secret dialogues about aid. L thinks highly of Thimayya, respects him as good soldier. Also respects Ayub and the Pakistani chief of staff.

RHE comment: Europeans are going to be pretty disappointed at contrast between L and Norstad. L is undoubtedly a fine soldier, but he tends to think narrowly in terms of military solutions.

Michel Gordey, France-Soir:

French reaction to Cuba was not wholly solid. De Gaulle was good; but Quai d'Orsay was less solid (and Couve de Murville hates everything American). Informed opinion supported U.S. stand. But great bulk of opinion, while pleased by firmness, thought U.S. took great risks and credited Khrushchev with saving the peace (I got this from several cab drivers, incidentally).

U.S. called special meeting of NATO Council last Sunday morning (October 28) to consider Cuba. Informed the Council that U.S. would take action, either by bombing or invasion, to eliminate the Cuban bases.

Reaction was very bad. All 14 countries protested. When U.S. said this was a matter within its responsibility and that it was only telling NATO for information, Turkey insisted that it was a NATO matter because Khrushchev's note had involved Turkey. France, surprisingly, was the most helpful of the lot,

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but Britain was particularly waffly.

At one point things got so bad that Chip Bohlen asked for and received a special appointment with de Gaulle at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises. Chip was just getting ready to fly down in the afternoon when word came from Washington that the crisis had eased.

Gorday has this solidly from Quai d'Orsay. Confirmed it with Chip, although Chip says: "Oh, Michel, it wasn't quite that bad!"

Chip also has told Gorday that he brings nothing special to de Gaulle; that his major role will be to be pleasant but sit back and listen.

De Gaulle, who disliked Norstad because of his boyishness and his international aspects, liked him better toward end. Legion d'Honneur ceremony was de Gaulle's own idea. DG angry because he was not consulted on Lemnitzer. People here view L as a castoff.

De Gaulle's hatreds an increasing problem. He even despises Couve. Also despises Gaullists. Michel looks for parliamentary elections to go against de Gaulle; but DG won't resign. He always threatens; but actually he always accommodates himself. Idea that de Gaulle always gets his way is a myth; look at Algeria. Gorday also still fears OAS.

EF Khrushchev once told DG that he had the ideal foreign minister: Gromyko would go sit on a cake of ice if K asked him. to Which DG replied: My foreign minister is one better. No, only will he sit on a cake of ice, but the ice won't melt. True story.

Gorday thinks Couve a hatchet man, determined to bury it in U.S. at every opportunity. He has none of DG's ability to adjust to larger circumstances.

Even though DG would not like Britain in Common Market, there now is very little question but what Britain is coming in. That is accepted in France.

Gorday, himself a Sovietologist, thinks Khrushchev in considerable trouble at forthcoming Central Committee meeting. Unlikely to try anything beforehand. Cuba lost him much face; also China against India.

Nehru when he came through Paris in September appeared well enough physically but the spark has gone out of him. This means vast changes in India.